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ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON THE FREEDOM 
OF THE MATHEMATICIAN 
I T IS NOT unusual to find contemporary mathematicians who claim to have an unlimited degree of freedom in their discipline. Some even maintain that they can study (at 
least symbolically) anything and everything. The mathema-
tician, they say, simply posits any definitions he pleases con-
cerning any group of symbols and relations among them, defines 
the operations thereupon, and then proceeds logically. Need-
less to say, these mathematicians do not consider themselves 
bound in any way to treat entities which resemble real physical 
things. (Indeed, they not infrequently give the impression that 
they have little or no concern as to whether their mathematical 
considerations have any application to physical reality.) Nor 
do they consider mathematics to be a science of abstracted 
quantity in the traditional sense, fearing that to assert this 
would needlessly restrict the range of their science. 
The purpose of this essay is not to pass judgment on the 
claims of today's mathematicians regarding freedom in their 
science. I intend rather to investigate the philosophies of mathe-
matics of two much earlier men, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, 
both of whom considered mathematics to be a science of quan-
tity, in order to determine the degree of freedom each allowed 
t;he mathematician in his science. Specifically, I will show that 
the medieval theologian's doctrines contain significant advances 
in this area over those of his Greek predecessor. Moreover, it 
will be suggested that to designate mathematics as a science 
of quantity, as these two thinkers do, still allows for a tremend-
ous degree of freedom on the part of the mathematician-
though it is not claimed that either man envisioned, or would 
agree with, the degree of freedom claimed by some mathe-
maticians today. 
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I. THE QUESTION 
Let us begin by returning to a point just mentioned, that for 
both Aristotle and Aquinas mathematics is considered to be a 
science of quantity. Let us hasten to add, however, that the 
quantity studied in mathematics is, according to both thinkers, 
a quantity not found as such in real things but a quantity 
abstracted from such things. As is well known, this abstraction 
involves mentally setting aside all the nonquantitative at-
ributes of things and retaining only their quantitative ones. 
In his famous text of the Metaphysics, a text which Thomas 
repeats with approval in his Commentary, the Stagirite speaks 
of the mathematician " stripping away" all features of things 
but their quantitative attributes, 
... the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before begin-
ning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e. g., 
weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and 
cold and other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantita-
tive and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, some-
times in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantita-
tive and continuous, and does not consider them in any other 
respect, ... 1 
Of course, it is precisely because of this mental abstraction, or 
subtraction, that the quantities studied in mathematics are said 
by both men to acquire their specific features as immobile, 
nonsensible, free from time and place and from sensible matter, 
and often possess less than three dimensions. 
And yet, though the features of abstract mathematical quan-
tities and quantified things are radically different, this does 
not mean that these quantities are totally dissimilar; indeed, 
both philosophers stress that it is in fact the quantities of 
physical things that the mathematician studies. However, they 
add-it is not as quantities of physical things that they are 
studied. One text of Aristotle's which makes this clear is the 
following: 
1 Metaphysics, XI, 8, 1061a 29-86. Thomas's commentary is In XI Metapkllaica. 
L. S, 220i. 
FREEDOM OF THE MATHEMATICIAN 288 
Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and 
points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics .... Now 
the mathematician, though he too treats of these things, neverthe-
less does not treat of them as the limits of a physical body, nor does 
he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of such bodies. 
That is why he separates them; for in thought they are separ-
able .... 2 
Thomas Aquinas makes exactly the same point in his com-
mentary on this passage. He affirms that the mathematician 
and the natural philosopher both treat the same things, but 
not in the same way. 
The mathematician and the natural philosopher treat the same 
things, i. e., points, and lines, and surfaces, and things of this sort, 
but not ill the same way. For the mathematician does not treat 
these things insofar as each of them is a boundary of a natural 
body, nor does he consider those things which belong to them inso-
far as they are the boundaries of a natural body. But this is the 
way in which natural science treats them .... Because the mathe-
matician does not consider lines and points, and surfaces, and things 
of this sort, quantities and their accidents, insofar as they are the 
boundaries of a natural body, he is said to abstract from sensible 
and natural matter.S 
Clearly then for both men the mathematician does treat real 
quantities but not as real. 
And this brings us to the heart of the question of this study. 
If mathematical quantities are nothing more than abstracted 
real quantities; if they are gained simply by " stripping away" 
all nonquantitative attributes of things, does this mean that for 
Aquinas and Aristotle the mathematician is limited in his 
science to treating objects which in their quantitative features 
resemble the quantitative attributes of physical things? It is 
true that both men give as examples of geometrical objects 
rather elementary figures, circles, triangles, angles, etc., which 
could easily be gained by abstraction from similarly figured 
sensible things! But does this mean that they believe that 
• Physics, IT, 2, 198b 28-24; 82-84. 
• In II PhyBica, L. 8, 160-61. 
'Heath points out both in A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon 
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mathematics is limited to just such quantities, quantities which 
bear almost a one-to-one relation to real quantities? If this is 
the case, then clearly the freedom of the mathematician is 
severely restricted. 
In order to answer this crucial question we will turn to a 
more detailed consideration of what psychologically is actually 
involved in mathematical abstraction according to both men. 
This will aid us in determining just how free each considers 
the mathematician to be in his act of abstraction. First, 
Aristotle. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF THE MATHEMATICIAN ACCORDING TO 
ARISTOTLE 
In the famous text of his Posterior Analytics where he de-
scribes the general procedure of obtaining the universal from 
sense experience t) Aristotle refers to the presence of what he 
there calls" memory." Animals which have memory, he says, 
are able to retain sense impressions and so provide for them-
selves some stability in the changeable data of sense experience. 
Actually what Aristotle there calls memory he will later more 
precisely designate imagination.6 Thus the role of imagination 
in all abstraction (using this term now in a wider application 
meaning the mental act of obtaining the universal from the 
sensible particular) is evident. This would mean, of course, 
that imagination is present in mathematical abstraction, too, 
for it also begins with perception of changing sensible particu-
lars. However, and this is a point which should be emphasized, 
Aristotle never refers to imagination as having a particular or 
special part in mathematics or mathematical abstraction.1 
Press, 1960), I, 841 and Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 
p. I, that Aristotle refers only to the most elementary geometrical figures. As for 
Aquinas, I can only state that in my reading of him I have found nothing that 
would invalidate this same conclusion. 
S Poaterior Analytica, II, 19, 99b S6-100b 1. 
• De Anima, III, 8. 
" Some authors, particularly those inclined to read Aristotle through the eyes of 
St. Thomas, ignore this fact. See for example, Mere St. Edouard, "La division 
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It may be that he simply did not develop this point, or, of 
course, it may be that he did not think imagination had any 
special role in mathematical abstraction. An elaboration of 
this second possibility is in order. According to the Stagirite, 
imagination" has the objects of sense for its object." 8 Imagina-
tion is said to be the act of a sense faculty (though just what 
sense faculty is not clear) 9 and is clearly distinguished from 
the acts of the mind, affinnation and negation, and the knowl-
edge of incomposites.10 But the objects of mathematics accord-
ing to the Stagirite are not sensible for, as we noted, the mathe-
matician leaves out the proper sensibles. Though his abstrac-
tion is based upon perception of the common sensibles, it is not 
these qua sensible which he studies. Since mathematical quanti-
ties are not sensible, it would apparently follow that they are 
not imaginable either, for, as was said, imagination is the act 
of a sense power, it has" the objects of sense for its objects." 
Mathematicals, then, would be knowable only by the mind. 
We might note in support of this last statement that Aristotle 
calls the matter of mathematicals " intelligible "; he never refers 
to it as "imaginable." 11 
And yet, from another point of view it would seem that this 
very notion of intelligible matter indicates that mathematical 
aristoh~1icienne des sciences, selon Ie professeur A. Mansion," Laval Theologique 
et Philo8ophique, XV (1959), 228 and M-V. Leroy, "Le savoir speculatif," Revue 
Thomiste, XL VIII (1948), 808 if. Frere Augustin-Gabriel, "Matiere intelligible 
et mathematique," Laval Theologique et Philo8ophique, XVII (1961), 187, admits 
Aristotle does not have the doctrine and says one must "read between the lines " 
to find it. 
S De Anima, III, 8, 428b 18. 
t In his On Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle states that imagination is an 
"affection of the sensus communis." (1, 450a 12) In the De Somnis, on the other 
hand, he distinguishes between that power which is the controlling or judging 
sense faculty (apparently the 8ensus c01nmunis) and that which presents images 
(2, 460b 16-18; see also 8, 461 18-81). Furthermore, he explicitly identifies the 
imaginative faculty with the sensitive faculty qua imaginative, though he does not 
say what this sensitive faculty is. (1, 459a 15-16) 
10 De Anima, III, 8, 482a 9-14. 
11 For a discussion of Aristotle's notion of intelligible matter, consult my article 
"Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aristotle," The New 
Scholaaticiam, XLIII (1969), 1-28. 
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quantities must be imaginable, for intelligible matter for Aris ... 
totle is viewed by him precisely as the principle of individuation 
of mathematical forms.12 Since individuals are attained directly 
only by sense and not by mind which is directly of the uni-
versal,13 individual mathematicals could be grasped directly 
only by a sense faculty. But since the quantities studied in 
mathematics are not possessed of any proper sensible features, 
they cannot be grasped by the exterior senses. Would it, then, 
be imagination which grasps them? To be sure, Aristotle does 
speak in the Metaphysics of individual mathematicals as known 
by " intuition." 
But when we come to the composite thing, e. g., this circle, i. e., 
one of the singular circles, whether sensible or intelligible (1 mean 
by intelligible circles the ma.thematical, and by sensible circles those 
of bronze, or of wood) -of these there is no definition, but they 
are known with the aid of intuition or of sensation; and when they 
pass out of this actual cognition it is not clear whether they are or 
not; but they are always expressed and known by the universal 
formula.14 
But is this intuition imagination? Some have so interpreted 
it; 15 Aristotle himself does not say. This much is clear from his 
text; it is not an act of direct sensation, nor is it an act of mind, 
that which grasps the definition, the universal formula. In the 
absence of statements to the contrary, it is logical to presume 
that it is imagination which is meant.16 Though exactly how 
such entities could be imaginable, in view of the fact that they 
lack sensible qualities, is still a question. 
But if Aristotle never mentions it, why this stress on my 
part on imagination? The reason is, and admittedly we are 
11 Metaphysics, VII, 11, 1086b 85-1087a 4. 
18 De Anima, ITI, 4, distinguishes sense knowledge from intellectual. See explicitly 
4i9b 10-88. Also see Metaphysics, Vll, 10, 1086a I-Ii and Posterior Analytics, 
I, 81, 87b 86-40; IT, 19, 100a 15-100b 1. 
16 Metaphysics, Vll, 10, 1086a 1-8. 
15 St. Thomas Aquinas interprets this intuition as imagination in In VII Meta-
physics, L. 9, 1494-95. 
18 Diego Pro, "Filosofia de la matematica en Arist6teles," Sapientia, XI (1956), 
99, discusses Aristotle's obscurity on this point. 
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looking ahead to Thomas Aquinas, if individual mathematical 
objects have their locus in imagination, it would follow that 
there is a certain degree of freedom on the part of the mathe-
matician in regard to his objects. The Stagirite himself refers 
in various places to the freedom men have in imagining.lT If 
the locus of individual mathematicals were the imagination it 
would seem to follow that the mathematician would be free to 
deal with objects which do not closely correspond to anything 
found in the physical world. There would be no reason to limit 
him to simply studying abstracted quantities which resemble 
the quantities of things, but he could treat quantities which he 
himself had devised in imagination which have no one-to-one 
correspondence to any physical quantities. Indeed, an episte-
mological basis could be provided for the tremendous develop-
ment in modern times of nonrepresentational mathematical 
systems such as the nonEuclidean geometries. 
Now it is true, as we mentioned earlier, that the Stagirite 
always cites as examples of geometrical objects figures which 
could easily be gained by abstraction from similarly figured 
sensible things. But our question is, does Aristotle in his phi-
losophy of mathematics hold that the mathematician must 
limit himself to such easily abstractable entities? In attempting 
to answer this question it might be helpful to realize that it is 
only the most general and basic elements of the genus quantity, 
e. g., lines, planes, etc., that he explicitly mentions as obtained 
by abstraction.ls Apparently all other mathematical objects 
are to be constructed out of these basic abstracted entities. 
No science, Aristotle says, demonstrates the very existence of 
the subject with which it deals.19 The mathematician, then, 
apparently at first posits the existence of these most basic ele-
1'1' De Anima, m, 8, 427b 18-20; 11, 484a 9. 
18 Thomas Greenwood, "Aristotle on Mathematical Constructibility," Thomiat, 
XVII (1954), 89 and 98. The fact that these elements are so general and hence 
so easily abstracted may well be the reason why Aristotle says that little experience 
is needed in order to become a mathematician (Nicomachean EthiC8, VI, 8, 
114ia 16-19). 
18 Poaterior Analytica, I, 10, 76b 8-28. 
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ments of the genus quantity gained by abstraction 20 and then 
through construction using these elements goes on to " demon-
strate the existence " and investigate the properties of all the 
other objects he dedls with. (Aristotle does say that before 
the properties of a mathematical object can be investigated it 
must be demonstrated that that object exists.21 The actual 
practice used at his time to " demonstrate" the existence of a 
particular mathematical quantity was to construct it.) 22 Our 
question is then is the mathematician free to use these basic 
elements to construct (and hence demonstrate the existence 
of) any figure he desires-any figure that is, whose very exist-
ence is not self-contradictory (like square circles)? Certainly 
the most basic abstracted elements, those whose existence is 
simply posited, are so general as to be able to form any figure 
or number. And yet the Stagirite never states that the mathe-
matician has the freedom to construct these elements into any 
non-self-contradictory objects he pleases. In fact, it is just the 
opposite as we have said, the only objects of geometry he cites 
are those which closely resemble physical magnitudes. Could 
this indicate that he never thought of allowing the mathe-
matician freedom to construct and treat objects not resembling 
quantified physical things? 23 On the other hand, it might be 
suggested that Aristotle would never have intended such a 
limitation of mathematics since numbers by their very nature 
as more abstract than magnitudes are clearly not able to be 
closely bound to physical quantities. 
10 Ibid., 76b 8-7. 
11 Ibid., 76b 8-10. 
II This is pointed out by Heath, ... Greek Mathe11ULtics, I, 887 and 877; Green-
wood, " ... Mathematical Constructibility," 89-98; H. G. Apostle, Aristotle's 
Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 4~. 
Euclid, for example, always constructed a particular mathematical entity before 
making use of it in a demonstration; for example, only after he had constructed 
a square did he go on to study it; only after he had constructed a perpendicular 
to a straight line did he use lines at right angles to one another. Though Aristotle 
does not explicitly say what he means by the demonstration of the existence of 
a mathematical, it seems most reasonable to conclude that the Stagirite has in 
mind the common Greek practice of construction. 
sa Greenwood, " ... Mathematical Constructibility," 98-94 and "The Characters 
of the Aristotelian Logic," Thomist, IV (194~), 244, seems to hold this position. 
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In reply to this last point we must bring out some interesting 
features concerning the way the Greek mathematicians of 
Aristotle's time tended to look upon their science. In the first 
place, it should be pointed out that among the Greeks arith-
metic was closely tied to geometry and to actual physical 
magnitudes. In general number theory was treated by them 
in the framework of geometry.24 From the time of the Pytha-
goreans on, numbers were often represented geometrically.25 
Euclid, for example, (about a generation after Aristotle) repre-
sents numbers by straight lines, planes, squares, cubes, etc.26 
This is especially true of irrational numbers, e. g., the square 
root of two which could not be assigned a definite numerical 
value but could be represented by magnitudes.21 Furthermore, 
the Greeks had no notion of imaginary numbers or of negative 
numbers, numbers which could hardly be said to correspond 
to numerical aspects of physical things. Instead, the only num-
bers they used were the ordinary whole numbers and ratios, 
1, 2, 3, i, 1, etc. Interestingly enough, it is not until Diophantes 
(late third century A. D.) that we find any mathematical equa-
tions used which involve numbers raised to any power above 
three, the cube.28 Apparently, because there is no physical 
I' Heath says, "With rare exceptions ... the theory of numbers was only treated 
in connexion with geometry, and for that reason only the geometrical form of 
proof was used, whether the figures took the form of dots marking out squares, 
triangles, gnomons, etc. (as with the early Pythagoreans), or of straight lines (as 
in Euclid Vll-IX) .... " ( ... Greek Mathematics, I, 16) Heath also points out 
that even problems which we would call algebraic were only solved geometrically 
by the Greeks. (Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 223, also . . . Greek M athematic8, 
I, 379 fI. See also his explanation of "geometrical algebra," pp. 150-154.) 
See also M. R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, A Source Book in Greek Science (Cam-
bridge, 1958), p. 1 and p. 14, n. I. 
15 Heath, ... Greek Mathematics, I, 76 fI. 
18 Heath, ibid., I, 16, 98 and 879 fI.; Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 222. 
''2' The square root of two would be represented simply by drawing a square of 
sides one and one whose diagonal would then be the square root of two. Many 
authorities feel that it was the discovery of the irrational that turned the Greeks 
in the direction of geometry and accounted for the" geometrizing" of number. 
See, for example, Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (New York: 
Abelard-Schuman, Inc., 1955), p. 57 and Cohen and Drabkin, ope cit. 
18 Cohen and Drabkin, A Source Book . . . , p. 25. 
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magnitude which has more than three dimensions, the Greeks 
felt any higher power would be meaningless. The very terms 
they used in arithmetic, some of which are still in use today, 
probably show more than anything else the geometrical frame-
work in which this study was carried on. Our terms like square 
(a number is squared when it is multiplied by itself once) 
and cube (a number is cubed when it is multiplied by itself 
once and this in tum multiplied by the given number) clearly 
indica te their geometrical origin. (Plato even refers to square 
and cube numbers as planes and solids respectively.) 29 Indeed, 
numbers were referred to by the Greek mathematicians as 
cubes, squares, as oblong, triangular, polygonal, diagonal, as 
sides, as rectilinear, scalene, spherical, circular-all fundamen-
tally geometrical terms.so A certain kind of proportion between 
numbers was called a geometrical proportion.s1 Various quad-
ratic equations were solved geometrically using the construction 
of figures. 32 Clearly, as we said, Greek arithmetic was closely 
tied to geometry and then to physical magnitudes. 
Since Aristotle, too, uses some of these geometrical tenus in 
reference to numbers, ss this could indicate that he shares the 
views of his countrymen that arithmetic is closely related to 
geometry and thus that numbers somehow relate to physical 
magnitudes. Thus, the arithmetician also may be considered 
by the Stagirite to be restricted to constructing and hence 
treating objects in some way corresponding to physical things.s4 
Ie The reference to Plato is in Heath, ... Greek Mathematics, I, 89. 
80 All these expressions can be found between pages 76 and 117 in Heath, 
... Greek }'lathematics, I. 
81 Heath, ibid., I, 85. 
8SI Heath, }'I athematics in Aristotle, p. i28; . . . Greek Mathematics, I, 879 fIe 
B. L. van der Waerden, Science Awakening (New York: Science Editions, 1964), 
pp. 118-li6. 
88 Physics, ITI, 4, 203a 18-15; Posterior Analytics, I, Ii, 78a 4; Nicomachean 
Ethics, V, 8, lI8Ib 12-15. A particularly significant text is in the Metaphysics, 
V, 14, IOiOb 8-6, where he refers to number in one or more dimensions, " ... num-
bers which are composite and not of one dimension only, viz. those of which the 
plane and the solid are copies," [italics mine] and of other similar features of 
numbers which he calls their " qualities." 
., I do not mean to imply by this that Aristotle denies the specific distinction 
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True, he in no place explicitly states that there is this restric-
tion, on either geometry or arithmetic. Yet neither does he 
give an indication that he feels that the mathematician, either 
geometer or arithmetician, is free to construct or consider ob-
jects which do not in some way correspond to physical quanti-
ties. And most important, though there is nothing in his 
philosophy of mathematics which positively precludes this free-
dom, compared to St. Thomas, there is precious little that could 
form the epistemological basis for such freedom. It seems 
reasonable to conclude, then, in the absence of statements to 
the contrary, that Aristotle in this respect is a man of his time, 
i. e., he considers the objects of mathematics to be idealized 
representations of actual physical quantities and the mathe-
matician to be restricted to such objects. 
In concluding this section we should note the one text that 
some claim gives some indication (though I believe it to be 
extremely slight) that the Stagirite has some recognition of 
the freedom of the mathematician.35 Aristotle refers to the 
necessity present in mathematical science as of a hypothetical 
type. He states specifically that" It is impossible, for instance, 
on a certain hypothesis that the triangle should have its angles 
equal to two right angles .... " 36 On a different hypothesis, if a 
straight line, for example, is defined in a different way, the value 
of the interior angles will be two right angles. Does this imply 
that either hypothesis is permissible? To generalize, does this 
mean that the mathematician is free to construct and define 
his figure any way he pleases? Note clearly that Aristotle never 
between arithmetic and geometry, between number and magnitude. Just the 
opposite. For instance, he criticizes the Pythagoreans for turning units into magni-
tudes. Nevertheless, even though he does assert the specific difference between the 
objects of arithmetic and of geometry, there is no indication that this leads him 
to disagree with his contemporaries who consider number in a geometrical context 
as representative of magnitudes. Numbers certainly are not magnitudes; they 
cannot be reduced to magnitudes; but still they can Tepresent (Aristotle calls them 
copies in text of previous footnote) magnitudes. 
15 Two who make this claim are Greenwood, ". . . ~IathematicaI Constructi-
bility," 91-98, and Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 101. 
It De Caelo, I, Ii, i81 b 5-6. 
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says this. Indeed, it seems impossible to say he is even implying 
that either hypothesis is permissible. He is saying simply that 
if a different hypothesis were chosen different conclusions would 
follow. He never says that either one can be chosen. At best 
the passage shows that he does recognize that different con-
clusions follow from different premises, but nowhere does he 
really say that the premises are a matter of free choice. Indeed, 
in the light of all we have already seen, viz., that the only geo-
metrical objects he mentions are those resembling real quan-
tities, and that numbers, too, at his time corresponded to physi-
cal things and their quantitative features, the indication that he 
broke with the prevalent view of his time that mathematical 
objects are limited to representation of physical quantities 
seems very slight. 
Let us now consider the philosophy of mathematics of 
Thomas Aquinas with a view toward seeing if he has any more 
explicit recognition of or epistemological basis for the freedom 
of the mathematician. 
Ill. THE FREEDOM OF THE MATHEMATICIAN ACCORDING TO 
AQUINAS 
We should remind ourselves at the very beginning of the 
areas of agreement of Thomas and Aristotle. For Thomas, like 
his predecessor, mathematics is a science of quantity abstracted 
from physical things, i. e., of real quantity not considered qua 
real. Does this mean that he limits mathematics to quantities 
closely resembling real things? We must reply that it is only 
such quantities that he, like Aristotle, explicitly mentions. And 
yet there are doctrines of his, doctrines not explicitly expressed 
by the Stagirite, that seem to provide the basis for a greater 
freedom on the part of the mathematician. 
One such doctrine has to do with mathematical abstraction 
itself and the objects which are its result. In one text, Thomas 
describes these objects in a manner that indicates that he is 
much more aware than Aristotle of their great independence 
from (even though they are based upon) physical things. 
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Aristotle, of course, clearly affirmed that mathematical quanti-
ties exist as such (i. e., with their peculiar mathematical char-
acteristics) only in the mind of the mathematician. Aquinas 
not only agrees with this but goes on to describe the objects 
of mathematics in terms which he uses to describe beings of 
reason.S7 He explains that, like the logical notions of genus, 
species, etc., a mathematical is not simply a likeness of realities 
existing outside the mind but instead is a consequence of man's 
way of knowing some things outside the mind. Things of this 
type, he says, are intentions which our intellect devises (adin-
venit) because of its knowledge of extramental things. And he 
adds, significantly, the proximate foundation for such intentions 
is not "in things, but in the intellect, however the remote 
foundation is the thing itself." 88 The expressions used here 
by Aquinas to describe mathematical entities are the same as 
those he uses in other places to describe beings of reason.S9 
This is not to say that mathematical quantities are simply 
created by man's intellect, for the intellect's act is of course 
rooted in physical things. But this is to say that that which 
immediately gives mathematicals their reality, that which is 
their proximate foundation, is the activity of the mind itself. 
(This is not, of course, the case with the beings studied in 
either physics or metaphysics. They exist in their own right 
apart from any act of a human intellect.) 
I would like to suggest a contrast, or at least a difference in 
emphasis, between Aquinas and Aristotle on this point. The 
difference as I see it is that, compared to St. Thomas, Aristotle 
tends to view the mathematician as more passive in his act 
8'1' In I Sententiarum, d. i, q. 1, a. 3 c (parma edition, VI, p. i8). (Incidentally, 
this passage was written by Aquinas late in his life and inserted in his Commentary. 
It should, therefore, give his mature position on the subject. On this point, see 
A. Maurer, "A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics," 
Medieval Studies, XXI (1959), 187.) 
88 In I Sent., loco cit. 
uln In IV Metaphyaica, L. 4, 574, for example, St. Thomas states that in contrast 
to a natural being an em Tationia is strictly speaking an intention which reason 
devises from the objects it considers, an intention which is not found in the nature 
of thinp but is a consequence of the consideration of reason. 
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of abstraction. To be sure, he "strips away" all the non-
quantitative features of physical things-and this " stripping" 
itself is an activity on his part. Yet when it comes to the actual 
grasping of physical quantity the connotation is that the mathe-
matician simply grasps what remains after all nonquantitative 
features are removed. He simply "liberates," so to speak, the 
real quantities of things from their sensible, mobile, material 
existence, and proceeds to study them-real quantities but not 
qua real. Now it is certainly true that Aquinas in many places, 
especially his Commentaries, speaks of the mathematician's 
abstraction in the same terms that his Greek predecessor uses. 
(See, for example, texts cited in my first Section.) Neverthe-
less, in the passage discussed in the previous paragraph he 
shows, I believe, more recognition of the activity of the intellect 
in the actual production of mathematicals. The mathematician 
does not just grasp real quantity stripped clean, he does not 
simply study a likeness of real quantities, rather his object 
is directly a product of his intellect's own activity-granted 
that the activity has its remote foundation in the experience of 
physical quantities. 
Now in putting stress on the intellect as the proximate 
foundation of mathematicals, in stressing therefore that these 
entities are not mere likenesses of physical things, in describing 
mathematicals as similar to beings of reason, it seems to me 
that St. Thomas indicates much more clearly than did the 
Stagirite that he recognizes that the mathematician's activity 
of abstraction, and hence the object of his science, is not simply 
a replication of real physical quantities. And there are other 
doctrines of Aquinas which also have as their result the freeing 
of the mathematician from strict dependence on physical quan-
tities, doctrines which also bring more precision into Thomas's 
statement that" the intellect" is the proximate foundation of 
mathematicals. Of great significance is his teaching on the role 
of imagination in mathematics. We will first discuss that role 
in general and then its specific relevance to the question of 
freedom in mathematics. 
As is well known, the imagination for Aquinas plays a vital 
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role in all knowledge, for he believes there can be no intellectual 
knowledge without the phantasms it supplies.40 Of particular 
import to our topic, however, is the special role it has in the 
science of mathematics. Unlike Aristotle, Thomas leaves no 
doubt that he holds that mathematicals, some at least, are 
imaginable. His texts which assert this are numerous; I will 
cite only one. 
When sensible characteristics are removed there remains something 
which is apprehended by the imagination .... Now mathematicals 
are of this sort.41 
Of course, in speaking of mathematicals being grasped by the 
imagination, Thomas is referring to individual mathematicals, 
not to mathematical essences which are grasped only by the in-
tellect. We noted in the previous section that in one place 
Aristotle spoke of individual mathematicals as grasped by " in-
tuition," and distinguished this from mathematical essences 
which are grasped by the mind. We noted also that he defined 
this intuition no further. St. Thomas clearly refers this intuition 
to imagination.42 Individual mathematicals as such are not 
attained by external senses, nor as individual are they present 
in the intellect which is directly of the universal. Yet as indi-
vidual they must be grasped by a sense power-the imagina-
tion.43 
And yet, to say that individual mathematicals are imaginable 
presents problems of its own. We noted in the previous section 
that Aristotle never asserts that mathematicals are imaginable, 
'0 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1 c; In III De Anima, lect. 12, 781. 
U De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c. Other texts which affirm that mathematicals are 
imaginable are: De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1 c and a. 2 c; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2 c; 
In VII Metaphysics, lect. 10, 1495; In III De Anima, Iect. 8, 715-6; Summa Theol., 
I, q. 7, a. S c; In III Physics, Iect. 7, 841; and In VI Nic. Eth., Iect. 7, 1210, 1214. 
U In VII Metaphysics, lect. 10, 1494-5. 
,. In the following passage Thomas clearly distinguishes the individual mathe-
maticals which the imagination grasps from the essence of these mathematicals 
which is grasped by the intellect. 
" In the case of mathematics it can be shown that that which knows the essence, 
i. e., the intellect, is distinct from what apprehends mathematical objects themselves, 
i. e., the imagination." (In III De Anima, lect. 8, 715) 
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and we suggested why. The imagination is a sense power, but 
in his abstraction the mathematician leaves aside sensible quali-
ties. How then can nonsensible mathematicals be grasped by 
the imagination? 
Because of this difficulty, some commentators have suggested 
that the mathematicals which Thomas designates as imaginable 
are not really the individual, quality-less, non-three-dimensional 
objects of mathematics but only individual sensible objects 
which come very close to being like them, e. g., a colored line 
made up of very small dimensions but not actually colorless 
or unidimensiona1.44 But this interpretation is contrary to too 
many explicit statements by Aquinas. In no uncertain terms 
he asserts that mathematical objects (in other words, the 
qualityless, uni- and bidimensional entities) are in the imagina-
tion. For example, in the De Trinitate he asserts: 
Mathematicals themselves come under the senses and are objects 
of imagination, such as figures, lines, numbers and the like.45 
And there are countless places where he makes the same asser-
tion.46 In fact, mathematics is the most certain science, he says, 
precisely because its objects are free from sensible matter and 
yet imaginable.47 The problem, therefore, remains-how can 
objects lacking sensible qualities be apprehended by a sense 
power? 
The solution must lie in showing that Aquinas believes 
mathematicals to be sensible; in other words, in showing that 
mathematical abstraction does not leave aside all the sensible 
attributes of quantified physical things. Bear in mind that 
quantity is a common sensible and that the common sensibles, 
"Some who hold this view are Bernard Lonergan, "Note on geometrical possi-
bility," Modem Schoolman, XXVII (1950), 1~7; E. Winance, " Note sur l'abstrac-
tion mathematique selon saint Thomas," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, LIII 
(1955), 509; F. Collingwood, "Intelligible Matter in Contemporary Science," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXXVIII (1964), 
110. 
1.5 De Trinit., q. 6, Ra. 1, ~ c. 
,41 See the texts cited in footnote 41. 
&'1 De Trinita.te~ q. 6, Ra. 1, ~ c. 
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like the proper sensibles, are directly, not incidentally, sensed!8 
Would it not be possible then for the imagination, which is able 
to combine and divide imaginary forms and so end up with 
images "even of things not perceived by the senses," 49 to 
present an image of an originally apprehended physical thing 
which image would be of only part of that thing, viz., of some 
or all of its dimensions minus all of its proper sensible qualities? 
This ability of the imagination would explain how Thomas can 
say in reference to mathematicals that "even when sensible 
characteristics are removed there remains something which is 
apprehended by the imagination." 50 At least some mathe-
maticals are sensible, and hence imaginable, because they are 
the abstracted dimensional quantitative features of physical 
things.51 However, these imagined dimensions are mathematical 
and not physical because by the power of imagination they have 
been separated from the other sensible characteristics of physi-
cal things and may have even been reduced in dimension from 
the physical three dimensions. What I am suggesting in effect 
is that the imagination itself performs an abstraction on the 
common sensibles; after all, it is not only the intellect which 
abstracts according to Aquinas.52 
48 Sum1TUL Theol., I, q. 78, a. 8, ad i. 
U Ibid., a. 4 c. 
riO De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c. 
n I say " at least some" (not all) mathematicals are sensible and hence imagin-
able. In In III De Anima, lect. 7, 758, Thomas, following Aristotle, apparently says 
that points, which are dimensionless units having position, and units, which are 
both dimensionless and positionless, precisely because they lack all dimension 
cannot be grasped by any sense power but are only known mentally by negation. 
It would follow that a number, which is a plurality of units, would not be imagin-
able, though some symbol representing it could be. 
62 To abstract, St. Thomas says, is to consider one entity without another when 
they are actually together in reality. (De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c) Since each sense 
power considers only what is proper to it and omits all other features of the 
material thing, it can truly be said to abstract. Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 8, 
ad i. 
One should not identify this abstraction of the imagination with the second degree 
of abstraction, else he will end up with the difficulty Winance has, "Note sur 
l'abstraction mathematique ... ," 507 ft. He clearly sees that merely eliminating 
sensible qualities by the imagination does not result in an object of a different 
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Incidentally, the fact that St. Thomas continually refers to 
mathematicals as "nonsensible" does not contradict this con-
clusion. For in making such statements it seems clear that the 
sensible features from which he considers the mathematician 
to abstract are the accidents which follow after the accident of 
quantity. "Accidents," he says, 
befall substance in a definite order. Quantity comes first, then 
quality, then passions and action. So quantity can be considered 
in substance before the sensible qualities, in virtue of which matter 
is called sensible, are understood in it.58 
Clearly, the sense qualities he is talking about, those which 
follow quantity, are only the proper sensibles. Since the mathe-
matician does not abstract from the accidents of quantity 
neither does he abstract from all sensible features, for quantity 
is a common sensible. The dimensional figures studied by 
mathematicians are not sensible inasmuch as they lack all 
proper sensible qualities. Since it is "the sensible qualities 
[which follow after quantity] in virtue of which matter is called 
sensible," the mathematicals can be called nonsensible. They 
are sensible, and hence imaginable, however, inasmuch as they 
are abstracted dimensions, for dimensions are sensible.54 
degree of intelligibility, or indeed in any intelligibility at all. Therefore, because 
he has identified this abstraction of the imagination with the second degree of 
abstraction, he denies it any validity as a Ineans of distinguishing the intelligible 
objects of the sciences, 510. The degrees of abstraction for St. Thomas refer to 
abstraction by the intellect from matter and motion, De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1 c. 
ISS De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c. See also Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2. 
U In the previous section in order to emphasize the fact that Aristotle never 
refers to mathematicals as imaginable, we pointed to his use of the term intelligible, 
rather than imaginable, to designate the special kind of matter found in mathe-
maticals. Some have in fact suggested that since some mathematicals are imaginable 
according to Aquinas he should have designated their matter as imaginable, rather 
than retaining the Aristotelian designation of it as intelligible. (Winance," Note 
sur l'abstraction mathematique ... ," 508-510) However, such a change of 
terminology is unnecessary, since in its most fundamental sense intelligible matter 
designates for Aquinas substance as the substrate of only the accident of quantity. 
But he notes, "the sense powers do not reach a comprehension of substance," (De 
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c) only the intellect does. Therefore, substance as the substrate 
of quantity is properly termed "intelligible" matter. On this point, see my article, 
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It follows from all of this that the imagination has an 
especially important role in mathematics for Aquinas-a role 
which, as we have said, is never mentioned by the Stagirite. 
For, in addition to providing a stable image from which the 
universal can be abstracted (this it does in all abstraction) /5 
in mathematics it furnishes to the intellect perfectly appro-
priate individual mathematicals, which simply cannot be found 
in nature, individuals from which the mathematical essence can 
then be abstracted. The direct senses are able to supply an 
appropriate object for the abstraction of physical essences; for 
the intellect's abstraction the imagination simply provides a 
stability in the changing objects grasped by sense. But the 
direct senses themselves cannot provide a perfectly appropriate 
object for abstraction of mathematical essences, for mathemati-
cal objects as such are not attainable by these senses. Rather 
the imagination, through its abstraction discussed above, pro-
vides the proper object, the suitable individual mathematical 
quantity, from which the mathematical essence can be ab-
stracted. 
By locating individual mathematicals in imagination, Thomas 
has served to further liberate the objects the mathematician 
studies from a close dependence on physical quantities. This 
freedom is even more clearly brought to the fore by his asser-
tion that the judgments of mathematics need only terminate 
in the imagination. In a passage of the De Trinitate Aquinas 
distinguishes between the origin and the termination of man's 
knowledge.56 "Now the beginning of all our knowledge," he 
writes, "is in the senses "; however, the termination of knowl-
edge is different in each of the three general kinds of science, 
"Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aquinas," The New 
Scholasticism, LXIII (1969), 555-576, in which I distinguish the various meanings 
of intelligible matter in Aquinas. 
rsrs De Trinitate, q. 6, a.!l. On this point one might profitably consult the articles 
by C. De Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter: Notes on St. Thomas's Prologue 
to the Physics," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XIII (1957), 140-1 and 
w. Gerhard, "Natural Science and the Imagination," Thomist, XVI (1958), 
190-216. I. De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c. 
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metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. "Judgment in mathe-
matics," he asserts, "must terminate in the imagination." I 
take this to mean that these judgments are true of, refer to, 
imaginable entities. Thomas explains that, if a judgment is 
true of realities which are only intelligible, it must stop, " termi-
nate," in the intellect, as do metaphysical judgments; it could 
not refer to imaginable or sensible realities and still be true of 
purely intelligible entities qua intelligible. Thus, if a judgment 
is true of imaginable entities which are not sensible, it must 
stop, " terminate" in the imagination: 
... because, when sensible characteristics are removed there remains 
something which is apprehensible by the imagination, we must 
judge about such things according to what the imagination reveals.51 
Finally, a judgment true of sensible realities, as in physics, 
must stop in the senses. To repeat, since mathematicals accord-
ing to St. Thomas are neither sensible things of nature, nor 
purely intelligible realities, but (some at least) are imaginable, 
a judgment about these objects cannot terminate in the senses, 
nor simply in the intellect, but rather must do so in the imagina-
tion. In order to be true, judgments dealing with imaginable 
objects must refer to what the imagination presents. 
There is another way of looking at this notion that judgments 
about mathematicals terminate in the imagination. According 
to Aquinas, in the mental act of judging we grasp the existence 
of an object, we grasp an entity as it is. This is distinguished 
from the act of apprehension which only grasps the nature of a 
thing and not its act of existence.58 Now since some individual 
mathematicals exist as such by and in the imagination, it 
stands to reason that the act of judgment must refer to, 
terminate in, that which the imagination presents. In this 
connection, we mentioned in the previous section that Aristotle 
maintains that before a mathematical entity can be examined 
it must be "demonstrated" that it exists. Though he never 
said exactly how demonstrations of existence take place, judg-
ing from the common practice of his time he is referring to 
If Ibid. 18 Ibid., q. 0, a. 8 c. 
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the construction of these objects. Thomas also speaks of demon-
strations of existence in mathematics, and he designates them 
as " operational" since they are by construction.59 Now since 
this construction can only be of individual mathematicals (it 
makes no sense to speak of "constructing" a mathematical 
essence), it must take place in a sense power. But the only 
sense power which grasps individual mathematicals as such is 
the imagination. Hence, the locus of the construction of indi-
vidual mathematicals must be this power. In other words, it 
is in the imagination that mathematicals are shown to exist, 
and this, of course, squares with the previously mentioned 
point that judgments of their existence must terminate in and 
only in the imagination. 
Of course, as we have pointed out, if the mathematician's 
judgments need only refer to imagined entities, this makes the 
mathematician very free in his choice of objects and the opera-
tions he performs on them. While in physics and metaphysics 
the intellect must conform itself to sensible being and intelligible 
being respectively as they are in reality, in mathematics the 
intellect need only conform to beings which exist in the mathe-
matician's imagination. 
Both this position and the earlier one which stressed the 
intellect's activity as the proximate foundation of the objects 
of mathematics clearly show that Aquinas considers the mathe-
matician to be free from treating only objects which resemble 
physical things. Yet how free? Is the mathematician free to 
construct any mathematical he can and then go on to investi-
gate its properties? Perhaps it would be of some help to look 
more closely at the passage in which Aquinas speaks of mathe-
matical demonstrations of existence-for this passage also sets 
forth clearly his analysis of the general procedure of the mathe-
matician in his science. (One will note that it is the same 
general procedure Aristotle recognized.) 
S9 In 1 Posterior Analytics, lect. ~, 5. Thomas also refers to construction in 
mathematics as the means of demonstrating the existence of mathematicals in 
In 11 PosterioT Analytica, leet. 6, 4. 
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There is supposed in these [mathematical] sciences those things 
which are first in the genus of quantity such as unity and line and 
surface and other such. These being presupposed, certain other 
things are sought by demonstration, such as the quadrilateral 
triangle, the square in geometry, and other such things. These 
demonstrations are said to be, so to speak, operational, as is: On 
a given straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. This 
having been proved, certain further passions are proved, as that 
its angles are equal or some other such thing .... 60 
The mathematician supposes that those entities "which are 
first in the genus quantity" exist (in imagination) and using 
these entities goes on to construct, to demonstrate" operation-
ally" certain figures or numbers composed of them. These con-
structions show that these composite objects do exist, and 
he then proceeds to prove the properties of these figures or 
numbers. As for the freedom of the mathematician in his 
demonstrations of existence, it would seem that he is at liberty 
to construct in imagination any mathematicals he can, and this 
would apparently mean any quantities whose existence is not 
self-contradictory. As far as the most basic quantities are 
concerned, these seem to present no limitation either. Certainly, 
as St. Thomas says, these elements-units, points, lines, and 
surfaces-are ultimate in the genus quantity. Nothing more 
basic could be abstracted and "supposed" by the mathe-
matician-and indeed, since they are the most basic quantities, 
how could the mathematician do anything else but" suppose" 
them? 61 These certainly contain no built-in limitation as to 
what the mathematician can study, for they are able to make 
up any mathematical object in the imagination. They present 
no limitation other than that the mathematician must deal 
with quantity. 
10 In I Posterior Analytics, lect. i, 5. 
et We might point out here that it is not up to the mathematician as such to 
investigate the real foundation of those elements whose existence he assumes. He 
simply takes them and goes to work from there. It would seem to be the province 
of the philosopher of nature to show the basis in reality of these quantitative 
elements and hence to show that they are not mere mental fictions. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We have stressed the fact that, because individual mathe-
maticals are located by Aquinas in the imagination and hence 
mathematical constructions of existence and scientific judg-
ments need refer to only such entities, the mathematician is 
radically free in his choice of objects, and more specifically 
he need not consider himself limited to dealing with mathe-
matical quantities which closely correspond to and/or resemble 
physical quantities. We have also suggested that this freedom 
is indicated by Thomas's teaching that it is the intellect's 
activity, not things, which is the proximate foundation of 
mathematical objects and, following from this, his description 
of mathematicals as similar to beings of reason (though one 
might quarrel with Aquinas and propose that it would be more 
accurate to say rather that the imagination's activity under 
the direction of the intellect is the proximate foundation of 
individual mathematicals). 
Though these doctrines provide an epistemological founda-
tion for the freedom of the mathematician from physical things 
as far as his object is concerned, it remains the case that, like 
Aristotle, Thomas also refers only to mathematical quantities 
which in fact resemble physical quantities. The only geometrical 
figures and solids he mentions are those of Euclidean geometry. 
He too refers only to real numbers (not negative or imaginary) , 
and he refers to them in terms which may indicate that they 
are still being viewed as related to physical magnitudes. For 
example, he refers to numbers as surfaces, as solids, as two and 
three-dimensional, as squares, cubes, etc. (though he clearly 
recognizes that such words are used metaphorically) ,62 and 
he never refers to a number raised to any power higher than 
three, the cube. 
It is true, of course, that by the thirteenth century mathe-
matical objects were not considered to be simply idealized 
representations of actual physical quantities, at least not to 
"In V Metaphysics, leet. 14, 974; leet. 16, 989-991. 
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the degree that they were in Aristotle's day. For one thing, the 
algebra had been introduced by the Arabs and put into Latin 
by some of the earliest translators.68 According to historians 
of mathematics, the most prominent mathematics book in Latin 
during Aquinas's time was probably the Liber Abaci by Leo-
nardo Fibonacci (Leonardo of Pisa) , published in 1202, and it 
was devoted to arithmetic and elementary algebra. Though it 
contained no recognition of negative or imaginary numbers,64 
it did have, in addition to the algebra, the use of the zero and 
of fractions and operations upon them.65 Furthermore, during 
Aquinas's day symbols were more and more being used to repre-
sent quantities; in fact, one who pioneered this was a friar, 
Jordanus de Nemore, who in 1222 became general of the 
Dominican Order. Certainly, the use of symbols, instead of 
figures or numbers related to figures, to stand for quantities, 
implies a view of mathematics which sees its objects removed 
from direct correspondence to physical quantities. In fact, the 
use of the zero alone indicates this, for it has no physical count-
erpart, and, indeed, for this reason it was looked upon by many 
as suspect. 
It is difficult to believe that Thomas Aquinas, who in other 
areas was so keenly cognizant of the newly introduced knowl-
edge of his time, would not at least have been aware of these 
developments in the mathematics of his day. Indeed, one 
author speculates that St. Thomas as a student used in his 
ea Maurer, " A Neglected Thomistic Text ... ," 185. 
e, First used by Raffael Bombelli, 1550. (D. Stroik, A Concise History of 
Mathematics [New York, 1948], p. 114) 
815 For information on this book, its author, and the general state of mathematics 
in the thirteenth century, consult F. Cajori, A History of Mathematics (New York: 
The Macmillan Company. 1951), pp. 117-125; H. Eves, An Introduction to the 
History of Mathematics (New York, 1961), pp. 209 fI. See also T. Greenwood, 
~tudes sur La Connaisaance Mathematique (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 
1942), pp. 66 fI. 
ee Greenwood, Etudes sur ... , p. 65. However, Vernon Bourke, in his more 
recent work, Aquinas' Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee, 1965), says that the 
quadrivium was no longer followed in the thirteenth century because masters 
proficient in the mathematical sciences were scarce, p. 22. And he gives nothing 
to support the view that Thomas was taught the "new mathematics." 
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studies the Liber Abaci, for it was a commonly used text in the 
quadrivium.66 Be that as it may, I know of no place in Aquinas's 
writings where he explicitly refers either to the algebra or to 
the zero or to the use of symbolism in mathematics. He, like 
Aristotle, refers only to figures and numbers which correspond 
to physical quantities. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this, it seems clear to me that the 
aforementioned epistemological doctrines of Aquinas go much 
further than Aristotle's toward allowing great freedom, to the 
mathematician. It may well be that Thomas himself was barely 
aware of the consequence of his own position. But it still 
remains that his teachings which emphasize that it is man's 
intellectual activity not physical things which is the proximate 
foundation of mathematical objects, and in particular his stress 
on the role of the imagination as that in which individual 
mathematicals are demonstrated to exist and in which mathe-
matical judgments terminate, are at best only implied in Aris-
totle. And it is these doctrines which serve to liberate mathe-
matics from any requirement of dealing with quantities which 
match real quantities. 
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